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York City Civil Court, Queens County, to recover damages for an assault allegedly committed by a Suffolk County resident in Suffolk
County. The action was dismissed on the ground that the court lacked
jurisdiction over a nonresident of New York City who committed an
assault beyond its geographical borders.21 Within six months after the
dismissal, but more than one year after the assault, plaintiff commenced
a new action in the Supreme Court, Queens County. Defendant invoked the statute of limitations; plaintiff relied upon CPLR 205(a). Special term dismissed the action, reasoning that in the absence of personal
jurisdiction in the prior action a timely action had not been commenced. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, ruling
that plaintiff's error in selecting the proper forum was distinguishable
from the failure to properly serve the defendant: it is only in the latter
instance that no action is deemed to have been timely commenced.
It has been posited that Erickson v. Macy 22 established the generic
rule that CPLR 205 does not apply when an action has been dismissed
for lack of personal jurisdiction. 23 Nevertheless, as indicated in Amato,
the pivotal consideration in determining the availability of CPLR 205
relief is whether the defendant has been properly served and apprised
of the pendency of an action before the statute of limitations has run.
If the court is satisfied that these conditions have been met, then CPLR
205 should be employed to defeat a statute of limitations objection.
CPLR 208: Surviving spouse is one "entitled to commence an action"
even though incapacity prevents her appointment.
Although the Estates, Powers & Trusts Law unambiguously prescribes that a wrongful death action must be commenced within two
years from the date of death,24 a problem arises where, for one reason or
another, the sole distributee is incapacitated. Under CPLR 208 the statute of limitations is tolled during a disability due to infancy, insanity
or imprisonment.2 5 However, the person "entitled to commence" a
wrongful death action within the meaning of section 208 is not the distributee but the personal representative. 26 Hence, the representative
164 N.Y.L.J. 66, Oct. 2, 1970, at 17, col. 5 (2d Dep't).
CCA § 404.
22 236 N.Y. 412, 140 N.E. 938 (1923).
23 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 205, supp. commentary at 49 (1964).
24 N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967).
25 Since the period of limitations is less than three years for a wrongful death action,
there would be a toll for the entire period of the disability for an infant and for a maximum of ten years for an incompetent or imprisoned party. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 208,
supp. commentary at 58 (1967).
26 N.Y. E.P.T.L. § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967).
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cannot escape the defense of the statute of limitations by pointing out a
disability - e.g., infancy - of the distributee.27
In Pulsifep v. Olcott28 the Supreme Court, Essex County, was confronted with the question whether the insanity of a surviving spouse
tolled the statute of limitations until a committee was appointed. In
Pulsifep the intestate died in April of 1965, allegedly as a result of injuries caused by defendant. An order appointing a committee for the
widow was entered March 16, 1967. Subsequently, letters of administration were granted and the committee instituted a wrongful death
action on March 6, 1968.
In view of the facts, the court reasonably concluded that the action
was timely commenced. A strict construction of CPLR 208 would have
dictated a contrary conclusion on the theory that a person is not entitled to commence an action which requires a representative plaintiff
until that person is actually appointed to the fiduciary position. Nevertheless, the court recognized the injustice of such an interpretation in
the instant case inasmuch as there were only two remaining members
of the family, the incompetent wife and a young child, and had the wife
been sane, her appointment as administratrLx would have been routine.29 It would seem therefore that a practitioner seeking to avail himself of the tolling provisions contained in CPLR 208 must show that the
disabled party had a prior right to letters of administration. This would
serve to prove that the real party in interest was in fact the incapaci0
tated one.A
CPLR 214(6): Second Department extends Flanagan rule of discovery
in foreign-object medical malpracticecases.
CPLR 214(6) provides that an action to recover damages for malpractice must be commenced within three years of its accrual. In medical malpractice cases, the general rule is that the cause of action accrues
on the date of commission of the wrongful act, 31 unless treatment has
27 Mossip v. F.H. Clement & Co., 256 App. Div. 469, 10 N.Y.S.2d 592 (4th Dep't 1959),
agl'd, 283 N.Y. 554, 27 N.E.2d 279 (1940).
28 63 Misc. 2d 524, 312 N.Y.S2d 219 (Sup. Ct. Essex County 1970).
29 See N.Y. Sum. Cr. PRoc. Aar § 1001 (McKinney 1967).
So If the infant in Fulsifep had been an adult it could be speculated that the result
would have been different. For, the adult daughter, rather than the disabled wife, would
have the right to letters of administration. N.Y. Sum. Cr. PRoc. Act § 1001 (McKinney
1967). Since the real party in interest would be an adult, section 208 would be inapplicable. Cf. Lamb v. DuPont, 181 Misc. 657, 42 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943) (statute of limitations is not tolled by reason of infancy in derivative action where the real
party in interest is a corporation).
31 See Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237
N.Y.S.2d 714, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241
N.Y.S. 529 (Ist Dep't), affd, 254 N.Y. 620, 178 N.E. 892 (1920).

